Revisiting Corruption Control Strategies: Review and Implications for Anti-Corruption Design Policy

Kiky Srirejeki, Kiky Srirejeki


This study provides a desk-research overview of the corruption control strategies, especially on the implementation of rewards and incentive, monitoring, whistleblowing system, anti-corruption agencies and punishment. This study, in essence, use desk-research approach, with reliance on the secondary source of data, notably articles in published journals. This study finds that rigorous empirical evaluation of corruption control strategies is scarce yet promising. From the review, this article implies that corruption is indeed a multifaceted problem, therefore relying on a particular strategy might not be sufficient to curb corrupt acts. The implication for the design of anti-corruption policy is discussed.


Keywords: corruption; anti-corruption; corruption control strategy.

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